internationalization of Danish and Austrian businesses by Klinge Jacobsen, Mår & Meyer, Klaus E.
CEES
Working Paper No. 17 December 1998
Opportunities in Russia: 
Internationalization of Danish and
Austrian Businesses
Mår Klinge Jacobsen
and 
Klaus E. Meyer
Center for East European Studies
Copenhagen Business School
CEES Working Paper Series
No. 1 Peter Nørgaard PedersenPrivatisation in Russia
May 1996
No. 2 Saul Estrin & The East European Business Environment:
February 1997 Klaus Meyer Opportunities and Tripwires for Foreign Investors
No. 3 Klaus Meyer The Determinants of West-East Business: An
March 1997 Analysis of Ownership Advantages
No. 4 Snejina Michailova Bulgaria in the Process of Systemic Transformation
June 1997 - An Overview.
No. 5 Niels Mygind Different Paths of  Transition  in the  Baltics
June 1997
No. 6 Niels Mygind The Economic Performance of Employee-owned
May 1997 Enterprises in the Baltic Countries
No. 7 Klaus Meyer Enterprise Transformation and Foreign Investment
June 1997 in Eastern Europe
No. 8 Snejina Michailova Interface between Western and Russian
June 1997 Management Attitudes: Implications for
Organizational Change
No. 9 Snejina Michailova & Developments in the Management of 
January 1998 Graham Hollinshead Human Resources in Eastern Europe -
The Case of Bulgaria
No. 10 Klaus Meyer & Managing Deep Restructuring: Danish Experiences
February 1998 Inger Bjerg Møller in Eastern Germany
No. 11 Patrick Arens Strategic Decision Making in the Transitional
March 1998 Economy of Romania: The Case of TAMIV S.A.
No. 12 Klaus Meyer Foreign Direct Investment and the Emergence of
June 1998 Markets and Networks in Transition Economies
No. 13 Klaus Meyer & ChristinaTen Years of Foreign Direct Investment in the
June 1998 Pind Former Soviet Union: A Survey with special Focus
on Kazachstan
No. 14 Charalambos Russian Management: Value Systems and Inner
August 1998 Vlachoutsicos Logic
No. 15 Derek Jones & Ownership Patterns and Dynamics in Privatized
August 1998 Niels Mygind Firms in Transition Economies: Evidence from the
Baltics
No. 16 Klaus Meyer Entry into Transition Economies: Beyond Markets
October 1998 and Hierarchies
No. 17 Mår Klinge Jacobsen &Opportunities in Russia: Internationalization of
December 1998Klaus Meyer Danish and Austrian Businesses
No. 18 Klaus Meyer & Entry Mode Choice in Emerging Markets:
December 1998Saul Estrin Greenfield, Acquisition, and Brownfield
 Acknowledgements: the authors thank all questionnaire respondents for their contribution. We are1
also grateful to participants of a seminar at the Vienna Institute for International Economics (WIIW), to
Christina Pind, and especially to Peter Krag for their helpful comments on this research. 
iii
Opportunities in Russia:
Internationalization of Danish and Austrian Businesses
Mår Klinge Jacobsen
Klaus E. Meyer
Center for East European Studies
Copenhagen Business School
Abstract 1
Danish businesses appear to be less active in the emerging Russian market than those from other
small economies in Western Europe. Therefore, this study surveys Danish and Austrian firms to
compare their business activities in Russia, and factors in the home environment that may impact
on this business.
The results show that Danish firms can draw upon less Russia-specific human capital and
fewer expanding business networks. In particular, Managers have less experience ‘on the ground’,
and Russian language skills are less developed in Denmark.
The study points to the importance of experiential knowledge in the internationalization
process, not only for firms but for national economies. Policy to support East-West business may
thus focus on the acceleration on partner-country specific learning processes.
Keywords: East-West Business, Internationalization Process, Market Entry, Russia, Denmark,
Austria.
 Of these 686 companies, 446 companies have some kind of direct investment, whereas an2
estimated 220 firms have a representative office [Wirtschaftskammer Österreich: Aussenwirtschaft,
Länderblatt Rußland L/30 März 1997, p. 7].
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Opportunities in Russia:
Internationalization of Danish and Austrian Businesses
1. Introduction
Russia has emerged as a major partner for international business in the 1990's. Despit  the financial
crises of 1998, it can be expected that Russia will develop into a key market for West European
businesses. Foreign investment in Russia accelerated from US$ 700 million to US$ 6.2 billion in
1997, temporarily overtaking even Hungary and Poland who became major destinations for
business in the early 1990s (Meyer and Pind 1999). 
The long-term potential of the Russian economy as market of 148.2 million potential
customers, or as location for low cost production, is huge. So far, business is inhibited not only
by the financial crises, but also by the legacy of the past, notably the undeveloped institutional
framework. Yet businesses are positioning themselves for future growth in the next decade, when
first-mover advantages are expected to pay off. Besides this, many businesses report profitabl
operations even during the current difficult times. 
Russia offers opportunities for small and medium size businesses from small open European
economies like Denmark and Austria. They can build on some historical relationships and
geographic proximity, and may thus gain considerable competitive advantage in the long-term.
However, to be able to build a strong position in the Russian market, they need to establish their
businesses early, both by positioning themselves in Russia and by building Russia specific
competence in their home base.
Over the past decade, companies from many countries have established operations in Russia,
not only firms from the main players in the global economy, like the US, UK, Germany and
France, but also from smaller European economies such as Belgium, Austria and Finland (table
1). Denmark, however, appears to be lagging behind. Foreign direct investment (FDI) reached
only a cumulative total f US$ 33 million in 1997. According to Russian statistics, Austria ranks
third as source country for foreign investme t in 1996 after the US and Germany, while Denmark
is not in the top ten. Danish firms appear less present in Russia, with notable exceptions such as
Dansk Tyggegummi (Dandy), Great Northern Telecom, Novo Nordisk and Danfoss. We have
been able to identify about 75 Danish firms active in Russia, most contained on a list provided by
the Danish embassy in Moscow. Yet 686 Austrian firms are reported to be active by the Austrian
Chamber of Commerce.2
2Table 1: Small West-European Economies and the Russian Market
Country Direct Investment Exports, mill.US$ Firms with
operations in
Russia.cumulative stock Share in FDI 1996  1997
million US$, 1992-97, 1996
source country data Russian data
Austria 110.0 6.7 2418 592 686
Belgium 221.6 1.8 1040 1077 n.a.
Denmark 32.9 < 0.7 652 743 ca. 75
Finland 178.9 < 0.7 1934 2367 n.a.
Sweden n.a. 1.9 665 724 n.a.
Switzerland 192.6 5.2 310 345 n.a.
Sources: International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook 1998 (OECD); Meyer and Pind [1998],
Direction of Foreign Trade Statistics Yearbook 1997 (IMF), own estimates.
Why is it that Danish firms appear not to be taking full advantage of the new opportunities
emerging in the East? In this paper, we analyse the national competitive advantages of Denmark
and Austria with respect to business in Russia. We surveyed enterprises in Denmark and Austria,
and asked them about their business activities in Russia, and their assessment of the Russian
business environment and of selected aspects of their home business environment.
Austria is an interesting case to compare Denmark with, because these two economies are not
only of similar size in terms of population and of GDP (Denmark US$ 66.3 billion, Austria US$
76.9 billion in 1995) but they also have similar business structures. The economies are dominated
by small and medium size businesses; inward foreign investors have an important role; and
manufacturing contributes a major share to GDP (21% / 24%). Both economies can build on some
historical relationships and business contacts in Russia itself, and bothar  very active in developing
business relationship with their immediate Eastern neighbours, Poland and the Baltics for
Denmark, and Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovenia for Austria. Yet both countries do not share
a common border with Russia, and thus cannot benefit from local cross-border trade as fo
instance Finland can.
We start with a brief historical introduction. The next section introduces national competitive
advantages as theoretical foundation of the study. Section four introduces the questionnaire
survey. Section five presents the key results on the pattern of activity, and business assessments
of country of origin effects and of the Russian economy. Section six interprets the findings and
points to the internationalization process that small economies are going through when entering
Russia. Section seven concludes with managerial and policy recommendations.
32. Historical Context
Danish business relationships w th Russia were very extensive until the time of World War I. In
1914, Russia was the third most important export market for Denmark (after Germany and
Sweden), especially for the shipbuilding, engineering and cement industry.  Business flourished
even during the war, and in 1917 the total of Danish investment in Russia was estimated at 400
million Danish kroner, equivalent to the annual budget of the Danish state [Jacobsen 1998]. With
the revolution, Danish businesses in the Soviet Union were expropriated, with the notable
exception of Great Northern Telecom [Jacobsen 1997]. During the cold war, Denmark has been
exporting to the Soviet Union on small scale through the state trading agencies, accounting for
less than 1% of Danish trade from 1918 to 1988.
Austrian business began internationalization later than other European economies. They
focused on expansion within the Austro-Hungarian empire before WW I and on maintaining
business relationships in the successor states thereafter. Russia entered the Austrian economy as
occupying force in 1945. The Soviet command defined the firms in their zone as extraterritorial
entities, took direct control, and exported most output and repatriated profits [Bellak 1998]. After
regaining full sovereignty, Austria nationalized the basic industries and the banks as a means to
regain control. Yet from the ten y ar period of partial Soviet occupation, Austria retained special
business contacts with Russia, in addition to its historical relationships with its neighbours. A
major share of East-West trade during the cold war was administered through neutral Austria,
with the communist party and related entities as key intermediaries. Although Austrians may not
cherish the memory, that period in histry provided Austria with contacts and language skills that
became valuable for business in the 1990s. 
Both Danish and Austrian businesses expanded eastwards after the fall of the iron curtain.
Austria reestablished business links with Hungary and other neighbouring countries and was at an
early stage in 1990 the largest investor in the region [e.g. Meyer 1998]. Many small and medium
size firms were quick to realize new opportunities while Austrian affiliates of MNE invested on
behalf of their parent firms. Austrian businesses invest more than US$ 500 million annually (table
2). However, Austrian investment did not grow in line with the acceleration of East-West business.
Austria thus lost its lead position to Germany and the USA, in part because businesses focused on
the integration with the EU after Austria became member in 1995 [Neudorfer 1997, Altzinger and
Winklhofer 1998, Altzinger et al. 1998]. 
Danish investment increased in the 1990's reaching US$ 250 million of new FDI in 1996.
Businesses focused on countries around the Baltic sea, notably Poland and the newly independent
Baltic states. This is for instance reflected in the portfolio of investment projects supported by the
Danish Investment Fund for Central and Eastern Europe (IØ funden): 91 projects are in Poland,
while the number of projects in Russia eq als that of Lithuania: 18 [IØ 1998]. Frequently, Danish
aim at the Russian market through their operations in the relatively more stable Baltic countries.
Both, Austrian and Danish firms have entered the Russian market in a second stage of their
4eastward expansion; and they committed far less investment capital - a wise precaution in view of
recent macroeconomic events.
Table 2: Outward Foreign Direct Investment
in million US$
Denmark Austria
1994 1995 1996 1997 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total FDI 4162 2969 2510 3240 1203 1046 1391 1437
FDI in CEE 48 197 247 n.a. 540 515 560 n.a.
FDI in Russia 0 3 6 24 7 5 10 74
Note: CEE does not include the CIS countries.
Sources: UNCTAD (1998, p. 367), correspondence with the Danish and Austrian National banks (3.2.98 /
20.5.98), Neudorfer (1997).
3. National Competitive Advantages
The pattern of outward FDI is determined by the competitive advantages of the businesses in the
economy. Firms require ‘ownership advantages’ [Dunning 1978, 1993] to compete successfully
in other countries, where foreign fi ms are at a natural disadvantage. Their ownership advantages
are strongly influenced by the national competitive advantages of the country from which they
originate. Characteristics of the national economy thus influence outward FDI via firms’ ownership
advantages. Differences between Danish and Austrian outward FDI are thus a function of national
aspects of their firms’ competitive advantages.
The concept of ownership advantages has been broadened since it was first introduced. In
addition to various tangible and intangible assets of the firm, Dunning [1993, chapter 4] also
considers advantages arising from combining multiple plants under common headquarters, and
from the synergy of multiple international operations. To explai  business with a particular partner
country - rather than international production as such - we need to consider furthermore
advantages of the firm related to the specific partner country, here Russia. Th se include firstly
the knowledge of the Russian business environment, and secondly participation in business
networks expanding to Russia.
Country-specific knowledge is a crucial competitive advantage because it improves the
investment decision, and all subsequent strategic and operational decisions. Lack of information
is a particular serious obstacle for small firms [Seringhaus 1987] because information is an
indivisible resource, and small firms cannot spread its costs acro s a large volume of exports in the
way that a large firm can. The information sought includes hard facts as well as experientia
knowledge that can only be acquired through active involvement but not by reading blueprints or
consultancy reports. Furthermore, the relevant information may be confidential nd difficult to
5verify, for instance concerning the strategies of key-host country players [Burke and Casson
1998]. Therefore it is crucial for international business to gain access to the most knowledgeable
and reliable sources of information. 
Beyond this, experiential knowledge, such as understanding of a foreign business culture, can
generally best be obtained in the host country itself. Such knowledge forms part of the capabilities
of the organization, or its individual members, that cannot be conveyed in codified form.
Therefore, the first step of entry requires expensive search for information and transfer of
experiences from different business context. Most firms then follow a path of gradual deepening
of their commitment in foreign markets, in the line with their accumulation of experiential
knowledge - a pattern known as the in ernationalization process [Johansen and Vahlne 1990].
The process occurs for starting business in general as well as for the entry into any new market.
In this paper, we use the term internationalization process to refer to the process of entering a
particular country, i.e. Russia.
Country-specific knowledge includes, in the case of Russia, the understanding of the specific
business culture that has been formed during the Russian history, and amended by the socialist
experience of the 20th century [Vlachoutsicos 1998]. It i  the foundation of organizational culture
not only in privatized, former state-owned firms but also in all other organizations in Russian
society. In addition, the economic conditions and the developing legal and institutional framework
pose specific challenges for unsuspecting newcomers [e.g. Thornton and Mikheeva 1996, Meyer
and Estrin 1998]. Last not least, command of Russian language is considered essential for business
success [Holden et al. 1998].
The survey study focuses on two aspects of knowledge: the access to information, and the
managerial capabilities. They form part of ownership advantages that firms may possess with
respect to Russia, and that are grounded in the institutions and capabilities in their home country.
Secondly, we focus on national and international business networks as a source of competitive
advantages, especially for smaller firms. Business networks are long-standing relationships
between legally independent firms, that exploit mutual complementarities and exchang
information. They include for instance horizontal cooperation between firms developing joint
marketing or distribution channels, as well as vertical supplier-customer relationships. Industrial
networks are an important source of knowledge especially for maller firms. Their interaction with
partners i  a major aspect of their learning process. Internationalization of a firm can therefore
facilitate the international expansion of its network partners [Johansen and Vahlne 1990].
In many cases, major multinational manufacturers lead a business network of SMEs who act
as their suppliers and distributors. The lead firm possesses core competences of the network, but
its effective utilization of these competences also depends on the partners, creating a mutual
dependence [Borrus and Zysman 1998, Rugman and D’Cruz 1997]. An international expansion
of the network may then be initiated by the lead firm, which is followed by its partners. Smaller
 The Danish firms are those for which details were provided by the Danish embassy in Moscow.3
The Austrian firms are those contained in a list by the Wirtschaftforschungsinstitut Österreich of 686 firms
active in Russia, and for whom contact details could be identified in the Austrian company guide published
on CD by Austrian Telecom. Contact persons in the Danish companies have been identified in ‘Kraks
virksomhedsdatabase on CD’ as responsible either for the former Soviet Union or for international
investment. In some cases, the CEO was contacted.
 The questionnaire was first designed in English and translated into German and Danish by4
independent translators and verification through backtranslation. As both authors understand all three
languages, we are confident that the translations are precise. The questionnaire was send along with a cover
letter containing a confidentiality st tement, and a pre-paid return envelop. Respondents were offered a copy
of the results if they included a business card with their response.
 Of the letters to Austria, nine were returned with the post stamp “recipient oved”. Deducting5
these, the actual return rate is 28,2%.
 Return rates differ internationally due to, among other, cultural differences. On a systematic cross-6
cultural study on return rates, Harzing [1998] found Danish firms to return 42.1%, the return of all countries.
Austrian firms completed only 19.0% of the questionnaires. Being aware of the different return pattern, we
send Austrian sample firms a reminder fax, which led to additional returns. Altzinger and Winkelhofer [1998]
obtained a return 16.8% for a similar study within Austria. By these comparisons, our return rates are more
than satisfactory.
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firms may thus internationalize to follow their customer, as observed for instance in the automotive
supplier industry in Central Europe.
The ownership advantage, that permits competitiveness abroad, may in such cases reside in
the business network rather than in the individual firm, as long as the firm is an essential
contributor to the network. We therefore requested information about firms’ netw rk relationships
and their impact on the internationalization decision. 
4. The Survey Study
We surveyed Danish and Austrian businesses to develop a deeper understanding of business
perspectives on both the Russian business environment, and the Russia specific capabilities in the
firms’ home environment. We chose to contact all firms that we could identify as being active in
Russia, and for whom we could identify the necessary contact information. In this, we went
beyond other studies in that we consider not only companies that have traditional FDI in the area
but all that have any kind of international business activity.
A total of 50 Danish and 144 Austrian firms were contacted in May 1998. The questionnaire3
was translated into local language and send to key informants in the firms, as far as we were able4
to identify such persons. 62 completed questionnaires were returned, 32% of those send out. The
return rate was 50% for Danish firms and 26% for Austrian firms. The difference reflects5
international experiences with cross-cultural q estionnaire surveys, and may have been increased6
by more precise contact information for Danish firms.
 Similar firms from Denmark are identified by Riis (1998) and Tind (1999).7
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The respondents represent a variety of industrial sectors. Of 55 firms providing industry
information, 36 are in manufacturing (13 of them consumer goods), 15 firms are in services (of
which 6 in transport services) and 4 in construction. This includes many small and medium size
firms, that have an important role in both economies (table 3). 30% of the responding firms
indicated that they themselves were affiliated to a multinational enterprise located outside
Denmark / Austria.
The questionnaire survey was complemented with interviews, most in informal settings, with
business persons experienced in Russia. We draw on these interviews, where appropriate, when
interpreting the survey evidence.
Table 3: The sample, by number of employees in the firms
under 100 100-1500 over 1500 n.a. total
Danish firms 21% 25% 42% 13% 24
Austrian firms 45% 18% 24% 13% 38
Total 35% 21% 31% 13% 62
5. Results
5.1. Business Activities of the sample firms
The firms in the sample are engaged in a variety of different business activities (table 4). The most
common types of operations are import/export (47%), services (39%), and the establishment of
sales offices (40%) or representative offices (37%). Austrian firms appear to prefer the former,
whereas Danish firms prefer the latter type of office, which may reflect the earlier stage of their
entry process. 11 firms (19%) have established production in Russia, and only five firms (9%),
mostly Austrian, source raw materials in the region. Some of the Austrian firms in the sample have
a very large exposure to the Russian market and sell more than half of th  tur over in Russia (table
5). These firms appear to be established specifically to take advantage of East-West business.7
The technology employed in the Russian operation is at the same level as in the home country
for half the responding firms (table 6). Almost as many firms employ a lower level of technology,
some of which using considerably lower levels of technology. Three respondents (6%) indicated
that the level of technology employed in Russia is actually higher than in the Western operations.
Among the 11 firms with production in Russia, the same pattern emerged with all but one
respondent indicating that they employed the same level or one level lower in Russia. 
8Table 4: Type of operations in Russia
in % of respondents 
Austria Denmark Total
Import-export 51% 41% 47%
Consultancy 20% 5% 14%
Representative office 29% 50% 37%
Sourcing raw materials11% 5% 9%
Sales subsidiary 49% 27% 40%
Production Subsidiary 20% 18% 19%
Service 40% 36% 39%
Other 11% 9% 11%
Note: Percentages do not add to 100% as the respondents could tick multiple options.
Table 5: Exposure to the Russian market 
Turnover in Russia relative to total turnover
1-5% 5.1-20% 20.1-50% 50.1-100% observations
Danish firms 43% 29% 29% none 21
Austrian firms 36% 20% 20% 24% 25
Table 6: Level of Technology Employed in Russia
+1 same level -1 -2 -3 observations
Danish firms 5% 45% 30% 15% 5% 20
Austrian firms 7% 50% 20% 20% 3% 30
Note: The table indicates he difference of the responses to two questions on the level of technology employed firstly in
Denmark/Austria and secondly in Russia. Both questions originally had a 5-point scale. 
5.2. Sources of information
Firms were asked to what extend they experienced problems in obtaining information about
business conditions in Russia prior to the engagemnt. On a scale from 1 (no problems) to 5 (very
large problems), the average score of 3.0 indicates ‘some problems’. However, Danish firms report
to have more problems in obtaining information (score 3.4) than their Aus ri n counterparts (score
2.7), and thus find themselves at a competitive disadvantage when considering entry in Russia..
To overcome their information barriers, firms use a wide array of sources [e.g. Burke and
Casson 1998].  In our sample, almost all respondents indicated personal contacts as a source, and
three out of four repo t business connections as important sources (table 7). This may imply that
much of the information required is either of tacit nature, or highly confidential, and therefore
difficult to obtain through official institutions. The institutions that provide information vary
between the two countries. While the chamber of commerce is important in Austria, Danish firms
are more likely to contact the ministry of foreign affairs, which provides information from and
9contacts with Danish embassies abroad. One fifth of the respondents also used their bank to obtain
information.  We return to the role of banks below.
Table 7: Sources of Information
in % of respondents 
Austria Denmark Total
Personal connections 89% 91% 89%
Business connections 80% 73% 77%
Chamber of commerce 46% 5% 30%
Ministry of foreign affairs 14% 36% 23%
National bank 11% none 7%
Other government agency 3% none 2%
Banking connections 23% 23% 22%
Other 6% 14% 9%
Note: Percentages do not add to 100% as the respondents could tick multiple options.
5.3. Human Capital
a) Required Skills
The theoretical considerations in section 3 suggest that human resources specifically educated or
experienced to work in the Russian business environment are important for the establishment of
business relationships in the country. To verify this proposition, and to identify which kind of
qualifications are particularly relevant, we asked firms to rank the importance of various
qualifications for taking the decision to establish operations in Russia. Table 8 shows the results
in two ways, the average rank assigned to each aspect, and the frequency with which respondents
included an aspect in their ranking. The results indicate that the most important qualification is
actual experience in doing business in the country. Having ‘worked with Russia and Russian for
more than three years’ has been mentioned by twenty respondents who a signed it on average rank
1.8. Practical experience is thus considered more important than formal education. These
responses lend support to the  emphasis on experiential knowledge in the  internationalizatio
process model. This has implications for how one might think of accelerating foreign entry.
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Table 8: Perceived Importance of Management Qualifications
Average Rank Number of Mentions
DanishAustrianTotal DanishAustrianTotal
They have been working with Russia and
Russians for more than 3 years
1.8 1.8 1.8 11 9 20
They speak Russian 2.7 2.0 2.4 7 7 14
They have lived in Russia for one year or
more
2.7 2.4 2.6 7 5 12
They are having private visitors from Russia
regularly
2.9 3.0 2.9 7 4 11
They have close personal friends from Russia3.3 3.6 3.5 6 5 11
They are Russian expatriates 2.0 3.9 3.7 1 9 10
They have taken university courses which
focus on doing business with Russia
4.2 5.5 4.8 5 4 9
They have relatives from Russia 4.3 5.0 4.8 3 5 8
They know the Russian partner from their
university studies
2.6 3.5 2.9 5 2 7
Note: Respondents were asked to rank the importance that these qualifications had for the companies decision to invest
in Russia. For each qualification, the table reports the average rank (most important = rank 1) and the number of
respondents that included it in their ranking.
The second most important qulification, by rank and by number of mentions, is the command of
the Russian language. Languages have an important role in multinational companies, that is often
underrated by the leadership [Marschan et al. 1998]. They facilitate or inhibit the communication
between individuals in different business units. While the leadership in headquarters and affiliates
may adopt a common language, for Scandinavian companies frequently English, this language is
often not used by middle managemet and shop floor employees. In extreme case this can lead to
inability of expatriate managers to communicate directly with local employees, and can become
a serious obstacle to organizational performance - as in the case of the joint-venture in Russia
described by Michailova [1998]. Russian language skills are therefore widely seen as an essential
qualification for managers based in Russia or communicating with a variety of institutions in
Russia. However, we encountered also a view contrary to this: 
‘Most important for international business is very good command of English, ... L cal language
skills are secondary. Most of the people we are dealing with - even in Russia - do speak good
English’ (former vice-president, major Danish multinational firm).
English is becoming the leading language of international communication in business as well as
academia (this paper being example of the latter). Fluency in English is thus becoming a
precondition for any successful international career. It is also basis for international trade, and for
board-level international communication which the above citation primarily refers to. Yet English
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is of limited use for running operations in the transition economies where skills in English do not
match those of Scandinavia or Austria. The following citation illustrates this for a Latvian
operation, yet similar conditions may occur throughout the former Soviet Union:
‘We were exposed to five languages every day. ... The official language of the authorities was
Latvian, and 273 of the work force and the local managing director spoke Russian only. English was
so to speak our working tool ... With some of the older employees and with our German suppliers
we communicated in German, ... and amongst ourselves [the Danish expatriates], we obviously
spoke Danish. The daily exposure to that many very different languages tends to keep ones
linguistic ability on its toes, but the constant need for translation is of course very time consuming.
I was very fortunate, however, my secreatart and interpreter, a young Latvian girl, was simply a
linguistic talent” (Danish businessman with interests in St. Petersburg and the Baltics).
Next to experience in Russia and language skills, further personal and professional experiences are
ranked. They give managers direct contacts with the country, or people from there, and thus
permit some experiential learning. ‘Russian expatriates’ are very frequently mentioned by Austrian
respondents, but only by one Danish respondent. Yet th ir influence is not ranked very highly. On
the other hand, contacts dating from university are mentioned only by seven respondents, but
ranked relatively highly by them. More intensive international student exchange may thus hold high
potential for further business.
Figure 1: Qualifications of managers in charge of the Russian operation at HQ
Note: The graph illustrates the mean response +/- Standard Deviation
None Few Some All
 They speak Russian
They have worked more than three
 years with Russia and Russians
 They have Private visitors from
 Russia regularly
They have lived in Russia for more
 than one year
 They have taken university courses
 focusing on doing business in Russia
 They have relatives from Russia
 They have close personal friends
 from Russia
 They know the Russian partner from
 their university studies
 They are Russian expatriates
 Upper line = Denmark
 Lower line = Austria
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University courses are also mentioned by several respondents as a qualification, but they rank
substantially below those criteria that provide mangers with a direct contact with reality of
 For our own efforts see http://www.econ.cbs.dk/institutes/cees/edu/cindex.html8
 The differences in the Danish and Austrian responses are statistically significant, see appendix9
1. One of the reasons for good Russian skills in the generation of the now about 50-year olds in Austria is that
in the Russian occupied zone in 1945-1955, high school students had to study Russian language to achieve
their Matura (high school graduation).
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business in Eastern Europe. This should encourag  ed cators to develop more applied courses on
business with to Russia.8
 b) Actual Skill Profile
The actual skill profile matches in part the profile of qualifications perceived to be important.
Figure 1 presents the results of the survey, noting the mean and the standards deviation for each
item, separately for Austrian and Danish respondents. Numerical results are contained in the
corresponding tables in the appendix. Because of the small sample size, most standard errors are
considerable, and we do not wish to attribute too much weight to small differences in means but
focus on the major ones.
Figure 1 shows that most managers in charge of operations in Russia have experience from
working with and in Russia for at least three years, in both Austria and Denmark. Equally high is
the incidence of managers with private contacts.
However, for some criteria the qualifications differ substantially between the two countries
in our sample, notably for language skills. Whereas a high proportion of Austrian managers speak
Russian, only few Danish firms can draw on such expertise: 63% of Austrian firms state that some
or all of their managers speak Russia, while the corresponding proportion for Danish firms is 20%
(appendix, table A1). Also, Danish firms employ fewer Russian expatriates and they have fewer
managers who have lived in Russia. 83% of Danish firms have no Russian expatriates, and 58%
have no managers who lived in Russia. In reverse, Danish respondents indicated more frequently
private visitors and personal contacts. These are weaker modes of learning about the Russian
environment, and we interpret this as default option that was given higher weight when more
tangible options did not apply. Thus Austrian managers are ahead with respect to relevant
experiential knowledge and language skills.9
Beyond the top management, we requested an assessment of managers i  the company (figure
2), and of university graduate in the country (figure 3). Naturally, managers are rated higher,
especially with respect to those criteria that require a practical business experience and thus
experiential knowledge. By these criteria, understanding of the Russian business environment and
of the culture and society, Austrian managers appear to be substantially better qualified than
Danish managers.
 Language skills are on average in the ‘acceptable’ range for both managers and students,
which implies that some firms are satisfied while others are not. However, respondents again
report that far more persons in Austria speak Russian, both among managers a d among university
Figure 2: Evaluation of management
Note: The graph illustrates the mean response +/- standard deviations
Very goodGoodAcceptableWeakVery weak
 Personal experience in R.
 Willingness to accept
 assignment in Russia
 Understanding of Russian
 culture and society
 Understanding of Russian
 business environment
 Russian language skills
 Upper line = Denmark
 Lower line = Austria
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graduates. Many Austrian respondents rated Russian language skills as good or extremely good:
59% said this about managers and 27% about graduates. Only 18% of Danish managers and 6%
of Danish graduates received this evaluation (tables A2 and A3). Similar differences emerge for
the understanding of Russian culture and society: Austrians received good or very good grades
for managers by 81% of respondents for students by 39%, while Danes received these scores only
for 55% of managers and none (!) of the Danish respondents gave this compliment to university
graduates. 
The only criterion in favour of Danish graduates is their greater willingness to accept an
assignment in Russia, which may be an achievement of the high degree of (outward)
internationalization of Danish higher education. 27% of Danish respondents gave graduates good
or very good by this criterion, compared to only 8% of Austrians.
In summary, the survey of human capital in Denmark and Austria suggests that
 Practical experienc  and language skills are considered the most important forms of country
specific expertise.
 Danish managers and graduates are less well prepared than their Austrian counterparts to
engage in business in Russia.
 Russian language skills are a particular area of concern, not only but especially in Denmark.
Figure 3: Evaluation of university graduates
Note: The graph illustrates the mean response +/- standard deviation
Very goodGoodAcceptableWeakVery weak
 Personal experience in Russia
 Willingness to accept
 assignment in Russia
 Understanding of Russian
 culture and society
 Understanding of Russian
 business environment
 Russian language skills
 Upper line = Denmark
 Lower line = Austria
 The activities of business associations in Denmark, for i st nce organizing joint trade fairs, could10
by included as network activity. However, we pr seume that the question as it was posed in the questionniare
was not understood as include them.
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5.4. Business Networks
Business networks in which a firm participates can influence its process of entry abroad by
providing information from business partners, and by initiatives involving several members of the
network. We therefore asked about the importance of networks in the firms’ decision process.
Almost half the respondents replied that networks had no impact at all, while the other half
indicated a smaller role (figure 4, table 9). Only 13% reported an important or even crucial role,
although the sample contains many small and medium size firms. However, we were surprised to
find very large differences i the pattern between Danish and Austrian respondents. Since Danish
firms are known to operate in industrial clusters, we expected a stronger impact of networks on
internationalization. Yet noone (!) indicated to be influenced to a large extend by networks, and
only one Danish respondent attributed a crucial influence to the networks.
The data were therefore further analysed by differentiating the results by firms size, but no
substantive differences emerged, except that larger firms are more likely to refer to their global
networks rather than local ones. The country differences in table 9 can thus not be explained by
differences in the size structure of the subsamples (table 3). One interpretation is that Danish
business networks have not yet expanded to Russia, such that they do not yet encourage
internationalization on that direction. However, this aspect requires further research. If th10
Figure 4: Influence of business networks
 Influence of global networks
 Influence of local networks
 Upper line = Denmark
 Lower line = Austria
Note: The graph illustrates the mean Mean +/- Standard Deviation
Crucially
influenced
to a large
extend
to some
extend
barelynot at all
16
pattern is confirmed, then Danish businesses may be foregoing major opportunities to gain from
sharing experiences and from complementarities in international business.
Table 9: The Impact of Business Networks on the Investment Decisions
not barelyto someto a largecrucially observa-Mean
at all extend extend influenced tions score
0 1 2 3 4 #
Partners in a local network
Danish firms 82% 9% 9% - - 22 0,3
Austrian firms 31% 23% 23% 15% 8% 26 1,7
Partners in a global network
Danish firms 67% 14% 14% - 5% 21 0,6
Austrian firms 24% 19% 10% 33% 15% 21 2,0
Note: t-test for the test of equality of means are significant at 1% level for both local networks and global networks.
A particular important business partner for many small and medium size firms is their bank. One
in five respondents reported banks as an important source for information (see above). To what
extend do banks then also provide funding for projects in Russia? The most important source of
finance are internal resources, which reflects the high ri k often associated with the business (table
10). The use of bank loans differs between Austrian and Danish firms as two fifth of the former
but only one fifth of the latter use them. 
Austrian banks have expanded very rapidly eastwards in the 1990s and may thus be better
placed to support Austrian businesses in the region. Asked for a recommendation as banking
partner, Danish respondents often mentioned an international bank (e.g. from Germany), while
Austrians were more inclined to name a bank from their own country. Danish firms are relying
more on governmental programs, such as the Investment Fund for Central a East rn Europe (IØ
1998), which aims at overcoming the lack of Russia specific expertise in the financial sector.
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Table 10: Main sources of financing Russian operations
Austrian Danish  Total
Internal resources 88% 95% 91%
Bank loan 36% 20% 30%
Private loan 9% 5% 8%
EBRD 6% 5% 6%
Governmental program 6% 15% 9%
Other source 12% 10% 11%
Note: Percentages do not add to 100% as the respondents could tick multiple options.
5.5. Assessment of the Russian business environment
Despite substantial differences in their business pattern and in their experiences, the respondents
from Denmark and Austria provided very similar assessments of the Russian busin ss environment.
Asked about the attraction of Russia for their business, respondents rated it with an average score
of 2.3 which is between ‘attractive’ and ‘average attractive’.
The attraction of Russia as a business partner is however greatly hampered by the high risk
associated with the country. In the autumn of 1998, the macroeconomic risk hit the headlines after
the financial crisis in August and September. Our survey was conducted in May, at a time when
the sustainability of the exchange rate policy was debated in economists’ circles, and may have
already influenced the perceived business risk. Nevertheless the highest score was given to
microeconomic and institutional factors, not to the macroeconomic situation.
The highest risk arises from the ‘unstable regulatory and legal environment’. In Russia, local,
regional and central governments frequently change laws that affect businesses. In addition, laws
lack clarity and are implemented inconsistently, or even corrupt (e.g. Thornton and Mikheeva
1996, Leitzel 1997). The relationships between business s and officials thus become cumbersome:
Figure 5: Level of risk in Russia
 Organised crime
 Problems procuring quality
 inputs for the production
 Deteriorating quality of output
 Partners taking unfair advantage
 of the business relationship
 Movements of interest and
 exchange rates
 Labour unrest
 Unstable regulatory and legal
 environment
 Macro economic instability
 Obtaining day to day supplies
Note: The graph illustrates the mean responses +/- Standards DeviationMean
High risk Very high riskMedium riskLow riskNo risk
Financial transactions affected by
government regulations
 Upper line = Denmark
 Lower line = Austria
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 Translation: “I try to be open for all the offical institutions, who come on inspections. Tell us11
what we are doing wrong and we will correct it, I tell them. The problem is that different people are coming
from the same institutions, and they interpret the law in different ways. They try to interpret the law in such
way that they can get money out of you”.
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“Jeg forsøger at være åben over for alle de officielle instanser, der kommer og inspicerer. Fortæl,
hvad vi gør galt, så retter vi det, siger jeg til dem. Problemet er, at der så kommer forskellige folk
fra de samme instanser, og de fortolker lovgivningen forskelligt. De forsøger all at fortolke den
på den måde, så de kan få penge ud af dig” (Søren Rasmusen, Emborg Foods, Moscow, in
Berlingske Tidende [1998]).11
Particularly sensitive to such regulatory uncertainty are ‘cross border financial transactions’. This
concern proved to be well founded as the freezing of financial assets and the constraints on capital
export at the onset of the financial crises showed. Related to the weak legal and institutional frame
are two further aspects that are considered high risk: ‘organized crime’ and ‘partners taking unfair
advantage of the business relationship’. 
Macroeconomic stability ranks third among the risk factors. The option on ‘inflation and
exchange rate movements’ which also implies macroeconomic sources of risk, received an even
lower score. In an earlier study on investors’ perception of risk in transition economies, Lankes
and Venebles (1996) found macroeconomic instability and regulatory risk being rated highest, with
intermediate scores for transfer risk and expropriation risk, and the lowest score for labour unrest.
Apparently, the legal and regulatory concerns have increased in the past three years.
Table 11: Risk Factors influencing the Investment Decision
Austrian Danish  Total
Cross border financial transactions being affected by
governmental interference
50% 38% 44%
Macro-economic instability 25% 25% 25%
Risk arising from unstable regulatory and legal framework 56% 63% 59%
Risk due to movements of interest and exchange rates25% 6% 16%
Risk of partners taking unfair advantages of the business 13% 13% 13%
Risk of deteriorating quality of output 6% 6% 6%
Risk of problems with procuring inputs of western quality6% 6% 6%
Risk of problems with obtaining regular day to day supplies13%  none 6%
Risk due to organised crime 13% 25% 19%
Risk of labour unrest none none none
Other type of risk  none 13% 6%
Note: Percentages do not add to 100% as the respondents could tick multiple options. 
Figure 6: How difficult has your company found it to find the following in Russia?
Note: The graphs illustrates the mean  response +/- Standard Deviation
Almost impossibleVery difficultDifficultAt times difficultNot at all difficult
 Partners willing to finance your
 company’s operations in Russia
 Banking partners servicing the need
 for banking and related information
 Partners for the formation of a
 joint venture
 Customers in Russia
 Suppliers in Russia
 Upper line = Denmark
 Lower line = Austria
 Translation: “One can wonder about the origins of the word ‘Russian roulette’. One thing is for12
sure - to do business in Russia is not easy. Yet those who know how to get around there, can expect some
good deals, and in the long run the huge market is going to take off - and then it is important to be there”.
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However, which of these risks actually affect business strategies, and which of them are simply
perceived as ‘background noise’? Table 11 shows that the institutional factors affect business for
more than the macroeconomic uncertainty. Two in five respondents adjusted investment decisions
due to the unstable regulatory and legal framework, compared to only one in four adjusting due
to macroeconomic risks.
We content that also in the autumn of 1998, after the financial crises, the microeconomic and
institutional factors are a prime concern for Western businesses. The financial crises and the
subsequent devaluation as such would lead only to a temporary setback of FDI flows, as in East-
Asia (UN 1998). However, the attraction of business in Russia is severely hampered by the slow
institutional development. This is probably one of the most important differences between Russia
and other emerging markets. Yet for those who understand the context of Russian business, it still
holds promising opportunities:
“Man kan undre sig, hvor ordet russisk roulette stammer fra? Ét er i hvert fald tilfældet: at handle
med Rusland er ikke let. Men de, r forstår at begå sig dér, har udsigt til gode handler, og på
længere sigt vil dette kæmpemæssige marked for alvor tage fra - og så er det om at være der!” (Ole
Christoffersen, chefkonsulent, Det Danke Handelskammer [Christoffersen 1998]).12
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Figure 6 shows a different obstacle to business in Russia: the lack of suitable partners. Customers
are plentiful, though their purchasing power may be weak. Yet it is difficult to identify local firms
with whom to form a joint-venture or who can supply raw materials and intermediate goods at
acceptable levels of quality and reliability [as also found in Meyer 1998, chapter 5]. Personal
contacts are still very important in Russia, and it is important to know a partner well before
committing an major investment in the business relationship, or the formation of a joint-venture.
Even poorer ratings are given to financial services by respondents from both Denmark and
Austria. This, together with the low proportion of projects financed through bank loans, suggests
that there is a major need for the development of the Russian banking system and the operation
of Western banks in the country.
6. Interpretation: National Internationalization Processes
Taking the various empirical results together, they illustrate an internationalization process at 
national level. The internationalization process, which Johansen and Vahlne [1977, 1990] describe
for firms, evolves with stepwise commitment to a foreign market, according to their learning about
the local environment and the accumulation of knowledge. 
National economies learn in similar ways as knowledge is exchanged to a high degree between
firms within an industrial or regional cluster. Especially small and medium size enterprises draw
upon the expertise in the local economy and its supporting institutions when considering a
commitment to a foreign market. This leads to a gradual deepening of the international business
by an industry from a given country (also see Luostarinen 1978). 
The internationalization process model can in this form explain the entry of Danish and
Austrian businesses in Russia. Firms take their decisions over entry into Russia based on
knowledge and contacts that they, or other partners in the home economy, have. The relevant
Russia-specific knowledge is often experiential and therefore difficult to communicate between
unrelated partners. Other knowledge may be highly confidential or difficult to verify and can
therefore only be obtained if a high level of trust relates the partners (Burke and Casson 1998).
Trust is however higher within small communities, and for instance higher between two Danes
than between a Dane and local consultants. The existing knowledge-base within a community
therefore influences the commitments that members of the group make to the foreign market,
which in turn promotes further learning.
This leads to a cumulative process of knowledge acquisition and deepening of the business.
Since it is experiential knowledge that is essential in this process, it can only to a limited extent
cross the boundaries of organizations, and of (national) industrial clusters. The process i
reenforced by the evolution of national business networks. One partner may enter a foreign
market, and draw its partners along as local turnover grows. While global multinationals may be
able to tap into several clusters and networks, small and medium-size firms are to a large extent
part on the internationalization process of their national economy.
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Institutions, like embassies, chambers of commerce or industrial associations, can provide
certain kinds of information, including some confidential information. They can also take
introductory initiatives, for instance by organizing trade fairs. They too ‘learn’ primarily from the
businesses they work with and which are from their own country. Therefore, they too reenforce
the national element in the internationalization process. 
Austria had a favourable starting position with respect to th  Russian market for two reasons:
 Austria occupied an essential role in the East-West trade during the cold war, which -  albeit
small - equipped Austrian businesses with contacts and human capital valuable for business
with Russia. The Danish-Russian business has been interrupted for too long, since 1917, to
provide a similar impetus (except for Great Northern Telecom).
 Austrian businesses have expanded more actively into the nearby transition economies after
1989, which permitted a learning process and transfer of experi nces to business further East.
From this basis, Austria could soon build a critical mass of business with Russia. This critical mass
implies that knowledge on Russia is so widespread that the entry process becomes self-
reenforcing. Having reached a certain threshold level, it becomes profitable for support services,
e.g. banks or chambers of commerce, to invest in partner-country-specific experti e. This expertise
then greatly facilitates the entry of further firms, accelerating the process of firms entering Russia.
Early entrants thus draw other businesses after them, especially those in their own business
networks. This process was strengthened by multinational firms locating in Vienna who both
benefit from and contribute to Vienna as hub for business with Central Europe and further East.
7. Implications
7.1. The West
Danish businesses stand at early stages of their internationalization process in the Russian market.
Having fewer recent historical relations than Austria, Denmark has so far not build a comparable
base of business expertise in Russia. Yet, the expansion of Danish-Russian bu iness is a cumulative
process of investment and knowledge acquisition (notwithstanding temporary setbacks like the
loss of business by Danish exporters after the Russian crises of August 1998 [e.g. Riis 1998,
Børsen 1998]).
The main objective for governmental institutions as well as for businesses in Denmark - or
any other small economy - should thus be to acc lerate the knowledge accumulation process.
Since Russia will be an attractive market in the medium to long term, they should now take
initiatives to build a relevant expertise to benefit from future opportunities. Specific measures to
facilitate this process may include:
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 Organization of meetings (workshops, export-missions) that facilitate the exchange of
experiences between businesses. This takes place currently for instance in the Danish ‘Baltic
Sea Network’.
 Expansion of cooperation between Danish and Russian institutions, for instance in the fields
of management training and student exchange.
 Support of the development of Russia-specific expertise in the financial sector.
 Facilitation of experience transfer from Danish operations in Poland and the Baltic states to
Danish businesses establishing business operations in Russia.
 Encouragement of the study of Russian language. Opportunities exists, yet few students
currently choose a Russia specialization.
7.2. Russia
Our survey points to the broad nature of obstacles to international business in Russia. They include
weaknesses of the human capital as well as the institutional framework. Managers and employees
in transition economies have to close the knowledge gap with the West, which requires intensive
learning. As for international business, it is primarily experiential knowledge they need to acquire
[Swaan 1997]. In other words,
“Don’t spend all your money on consultancy reports ... they have too many of them already .. go
there and work with the people, achieve results together ... that’s what they need” (Danish
businessman with interests in St. Petersburg and the Baltics).
The prime concerns of Western business partners relate however to microeconomic structures and
institutions, which confirms similar results in earlier studies on Russia. The policy implication thus
is that Russia has to advance its microeconomic transformation from plan to market. Crucial in this
process are the development of market-based institutions and a consistent and stable legal
framework. This will support the development of both local and foreign businesses. Until this
happens, international businesses will limit themselves to short-term profit opportunities and to
toe-hold strategies, but restrain from the commitment of larger amounts of capital.
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Appendix 1: Statistical Tables
Table A1: Qualifications of managers in charge of the Russian operation at HQ
None Few Some All total Mean StD signif.
A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK
13% 11% 34% 6% -- 0,00They are Russian expatriates41% 83% 13% 50 3,2 2,2 1,1 0,5
18% 16% 36% 21% 0,74They have lived in Russia for one
year or more
25% 58% 21% 5% 47 3,5 2,7 1,1 1,0
44% 30% 0,89They are having private visitors
from Russia regularly
8%  -- 24% 20% 24% 50% 45 3,8 4,3 0,9 0,8
20% 5% 40% 48% 0,94They have been working with
Russia and Russians for more
than 3 years
10% 5% 30% 43% 51 3,9 4,3 1,0 0,8
25% 43% 25% 10% 0,23They speak Russian 13% 38% 38% 10% 53 3,9 2,9 1,1 0,9
21% 10% 0,55They have taken university
courses which focus on doing
business in Russia
68% 76% 7% 5% 4% 10% 49 2,5 2,5 0,8 1,0
29% 15% 14% 5% 0,74They have relatives from Russia54% 75% 4% 5% 48 2,7 2,4 0,9 0,8
19% 43% 43% 33% 0,81They have close personal friends
from Russia
18% 32% 7% 5% 49 3,4 3,2 0,9 0,8
19% 15% 7% 5% 0,78They know the Russian partner
from their university studies
67% 75% 7% 5% 47 2,6 2,4 0,9 0,8
-- -- -- --Other reasons 33%  -- 33% 100% 33% 4,0 5,0 4,0 -- 1,0
Note: signif = level of significance of a t-test of the equality of means of the Austrian and Danish sub-samples.
(0,00 = very low probability of error in saying that ‘the mean is different’)
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Table A2: Evaluation of management
Poor UnsatisfactoryAcceptable Good Extremely good total Mean StD signif.
A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK
16% 32% 19% 18% 1,3 0,00Russian language skills 6% 32% 25% 9% 34% 9% 54 3,7 2,3 1,3
23% 0,9 0,11Understanding of Russian
business environment
-- 5% -- 5% 30% 30% 55% 39% 14% 55 4,1 3,7 0,8
 -- 9% 36% 0,9 0,03Understanding of Russian culture
and society
 -- 6% 12% 45% 41% 36% 14% 55 4,1 3,6 0,9
18% 36% 30% 23% 1,1 0,14Willingness to accept assignment
in Russia
9% 9% 18% 27% 24% 5% 55 3,3 2,8 1,3
-- 15% 18% 0,9 0,46Personal experience in Russia -- 9% 9% 42% 55% 33% 18% 55 4,0 3,8 0,9
Note: signif = level of significance of a t-test of the equality of means of the Austrian and Danish sub-samples.
Table A3: Evaluation of university graduates
Poor UnsatisfactoryAcceptable Good Extremely good total Mean StD signif.
A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK
31% 25% 35% 31% 1,0 0,02Russian language skills 8% 38% 23% 6% 4%  -- 42 2,8 2,1 1,0
42% 50% 35% 31% 0,7 0,37Understanding of Russian
business environment
15% 19% 8%  --  --  -- 42 2,3 2,1 0,8
31% 56% 27% 38% 0,01Understanding of Russian culture
and society
4% 6% 35%  -- 4%  -- 42 3,0 2,3 1,0 0,6
28% 27% 40% 40% 1,0 0,10Willingness to accept assignment
in Russia
24% 7% 4% 20% 4% 7% 40 2,4 2,9 1,0
42% 40% 29% 0,8 0,48Personal experience in Russia25% 33% 27% 4%  --  --  -- 39 2,1 1,9 0,9
Note: signif = level of significance of a t-test of the equality of means of the Austrian and Danish sub-samples.
Table A6:  How difficult has your company found it to find the following in Russia?
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Not at all At times Difficult Very difficultAlmost impossibletotal Mean StD signif.
difficult difficult
A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK
32% 37% 21% 16% 1,3 0,09Suppliers in Russia 4% 5% 36% 21% 7% 21% 47 3,1 3,2 1,1
38% 41% 34% 23% -- -- 0,9 0,31Customers in Russia 22% 32% 6% 5%  54 2,3 2,0 0,9
33% 23% 15% 31% 0,58Partners for the formation of a
joint venture
15% 8% 26% 31% 11% 8% 40 2,9 3,1 1,3 1,1
25% 12% 4% 24% 1,5 0,87Banking partners servicing the
needs for banking and related
information
8% 12% 17% 12% 46% 41% 41 3,7 3,6 1,5
26% 7% 13% 1,6 0,66Partners willing to finance your
company’s operations in Russia
9% 20% 20% 30% 7% 22% 47% 38 3,3 3,5 1,3
Other partners 50%  -- 50%  -- --  --  --  --  --  -- 2 1,5 -- 0,7 -- --
Note: signif = level of significance of a t-test of the equality of means of the Austrian and Danish sub-samples.
Table A4:  To which extent did the establishment in Russia by partners of your business network, influence your company’s decision to establish operations
in Russia?
StD signif.Not at all Barely To some
extent extent influenced
To a large Crucially total Mean
A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK
Partners in your local Network31% 82% 23% 9% 23% 9% 15% -- 8% -- 48 2,5 1,3 1,3 0,6 0,00
Partners in a Global Network in24% 67% 19% 14% 10% 14% 33% -- 14% 5% 42 3,0 1,6 1,5 1,1 0,00
which your company participates
Note: signif = level of significance of a t-test of the equality of means of the Austrian and Danish sub-samples.
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Table A5:  Please estimate the level of the different types of risk influencing your company’s operations in Russia
signif.No risk Low risk Moderate
risk
High risk extremely high risktotal Mean   StD Mean    StDMean   StD
A DK A DK A DK A DK A DK Austria Denmark Total
32% 41% 0,99Cross border financial
transactions being affected by
government regulations
3%  -- 18% 9% 29% 50% 18% -- 56 3,4 1,1 3,4 0,7 3,4 0,9
46% 41% 0,58Macro economic instability 4%  -- 11% 9% 29% 45% 11% 5% 50 3,3 0,9 3,5 0,7 3,4 0,9
-- 23% 9% 0,85Risk of problems arising from
unstable regulatory and legal
environment
-- 9% 5% 37% 73% 31% 14% 57 3,9 1,0 4,0 0,7 3,9 0,8
49% 68% 20% 27% -- 0,50Risk of labour unrest 17% 5% 9% 6%  -- 57 2,4 1,1 2,2 0,5 2,3 0,9
31% 36% 26% 27% 0,48Risk of losses due to movements
of interest and exchange rates
14% 18% 26% 14% 3% 5% 57 2,7 1,1 2,5 1,1 2,6 1,1
26% 24% 23% 38% 0,70Risk of partners taking unfair
advantages of the business
relationship
11% 5% 14% 29% 26% 5% 56 3,2 1,4 3,0 1,0 3,1 1,2
25% 42% 25% 21% 0,14Risk of deteriorating quality of
output
28% 32% 19% 5% 3%  -- 51 2,4 1,2 2,0 0,9 2,3 1,1
21% 30% 0,09Risk of problems with procuring
inputs to the production of
western quality
21% 25% 35% 27% 18% 10% 12%  -- 53 2,8 1,3 2,3 1,0 2,6 1,2
21% 40% 21% 35% 0,09Risk of problems with obtaining
regular day to day supplies
18% 15% 30% 10% 9%  -- 53 2,9 1,3 2,4 0,9 2,7 1,2
12% 35% 21% 35% 0,16Risk due to organised crime 9% 5% 42% 10% 15% 15% 53 3,4 1,2 3,0 1,1 3,2 1,2
 -- 73% 44% 0,89Other type of risk  -- 27% 44%  --  --  -- 11% 20 2,7 0,5 2,8 1,0 2,8 0,7
Note: signif = level of significance of a t-test of the equality of means of the Austrian and Danish sub-samples.
